Act as an experienced incident facilitator. Create a blameless postmortem from the materials below. Focus on system conditions, decisions, signals, and controls—not individual fault. Do not infer facts that are not in the record. Incident: [INCIDENT SUMMARY] Timeline and evidence: [TIMELINE AND EVIDENCE] Impact: [IMPACT DETAILS] People, systems, and constraints: [CONTEXT AND PARTICIPANTS] Known follow-up work: [EXISTING ACTION ITEMS] Produce a 900–1,300 word postmortem with these sections: 1. Executive summary: 3–5 sentences covering customer/business impact, duration, primary failure mechanism, and current status. 2. Impact and scope: affected users, services, data, revenue or commitments, and what was not affected. Separate known facts from estimates. 3. Timeline: a chronological table with time, event/observation, decision or action, and evidence source. Preserve uncertainty where timestamps conflict. 4. What happened: a concise narrative connecting triggering event, detection, response, recovery, and resolution. 5. Contributing factors: distinguish root cause, contributing conditions, and response gaps. Use “because” chains only where evidence supports them; avoid calling a person or a single mistake the root cause. 6. What worked / what did not: include detection, communications, runbooks, escalation, rollback, and decision-making when relevant. 7. Corrective actions: a table with action, failure mode addressed, owner, priority (P0/P1/P2), due date or proposed target, and verification method. Mark an owner or date as “unassigned” rather than inventing one. Prefer changes that reduce recurrence, shorten detection, or limit blast radius. 8. Open questions and decisions needed. Before answering, check that every causal claim traces to supplied evidence and flag unsupported claims. Also check that each action addresses a stated contributing factor and has a measurable completion test. Ask up to 3 clarifying questions only if a required input is missing; otherwise state assumptions briefly and proceed.
Fill in
| Placeholder | What to enter | Example |
|---|---|---|
| [INCIDENT SUMMARY] | Enter a one- or two-sentence description of the incident and its date. | On 14 May, checkout requests failed intermittently after a payment API configuration change. |
| [TIMELINE AND EVIDENCE] | Paste timestamps, logs, alerts, meeting notes, tickets, and relevant observations. | 09:02 deploy completed; 09:07 error alert fired; 09:19 on-call began rollback; 09:31 error rate returned to baseline. |
| [IMPACT DETAILS] | Describe affected users, duration, services, commitments, and any known costs or risks. | About 18% of checkout attempts failed for 24 minutes; no payment data was lost or exposed. |
| [CONTEXT AND PARTICIPANTS] | List relevant systems, teams, roles, dependencies, and operating constraints. | Payments API, feature-flag service, on-call SRE, payments engineer, third-party gateway with a 10-minute cache. |
| [EXISTING ACTION ITEMS] | Paste follow-up ideas, assigned work, or decisions already made. | Add a pre-deploy gateway validation; review alert routing; assign rollback runbook owner. |
How to use
- Paste the incident record, including raw timestamps and contradictory evidence rather than smoothing it out.
- Replace each bracketed field, then copy the full prompt into ChatGPT, Claude, or Gemini.
- Check the timeline against logs and ensure proposed owners and dates were not invented.
- Follow up with: “Turn the corrective-action table into a weekly review agenda, listing evidence required to close each item.”
Variations
Executive readout
Use when leaders need a short decision-oriented incident brief.
Create a one-page executive incident readout from [INCIDENT NOTES] and [IMPACT DATA]. Include: what happened, customer and business impact, present risk, three most important contributing conditions, decisions needed from leadership, and a five-row action table with owner and due date only where supplied. Write for nontechnical leaders; define necessary technical terms in plain language. Do not name individuals as causes or invent metrics, ownership, or dates. Flag any unresolved fact that could alter the impact assessment.
Five whys review
Use when you need to test a suspected causal chain before assigning fixes.
Analyze [FAILURE DESCRIPTION], [EVIDENCE], and [CURRENT HYPOTHESIS] using a disciplined five-whys review. State the observed failure first, then build only evidence-supported “why” links. At each link, label it fact, inference, or unknown. Stop the chain where evidence ends instead of filling gaps. Output a table with why, supporting evidence, confidence, and what would verify it, followed by safeguards that would reduce the failure’s likelihood or blast radius. Do not assign blame to people.
Action-item review
Use when a previous postmortem has too many vague or stalled follow-ups.
Review these postmortem actions: [ACTION LIST]. For each action, identify the specific failure mode it addresses using [POSTMORTEM FINDINGS], then rate it as prevention, detection, containment, or recovery. Rewrite vague actions into testable work with a completion signal, proposed priority, dependency, and owner field. Retain supplied owners and dates; use “unassigned” or “target needed” for missing information. Output a ranked table, followed by actions that should be merged, removed, or escalated because they do not address a documented finding.
Tips
- Freeze the evidence set before the review: logs, alert history, ticket timestamps, and decision records often disagree, and that disagreement belongs in the postmortem.
- Separate the triggering event from the conditions that made it harmful; a configuration change may trigger an outage, while missing validation and weak rollback controls make it recur.
- An action item is not complete because a ticket was closed; define proof such as a tested alert, a game-day result, or a deployment check.
- Keep remediation proportional to the impact and recurrence risk so the team does not create a long list of low-value promises.
FAQ
Should a postmortem name the person who made the change?
Name roles and decisions when they help explain the system, but do not frame an individual as the cause. The useful question is what conditions allowed a reasonable action to produce harm.
What if the root cause is still uncertain?
Say so plainly. Document the leading hypotheses, the evidence for each, and the investigation needed to resolve them.
How many action items should we create?
Prefer a small set of actions with clear risk reduction and verification over a long list of generic reminders.